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SECTION 15 JURISPRUDENCE IN 
THE SUPREME COURT OF 











This paper reviews the four decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
2000 that considered equality rights issues under section 15 of the Charter.1 Our 
goal is to summarize the cases and to comment upon each in terms of its 
significance for equality rights jurisprudence.  
We do not find strong common themes among the four cases (aside from the 
fact that they were all decided in 2000). Granovsky2 is a pure section 15 case, 
and involves an application of the Law3 case. In our view, Granovsky does not 
extend the law, but it does illustrate the weaknesses in the Law analysis. 
Boisbriand4 is a section 15 case involving Quebec human rights law. Again, we 
do not believe it extends principles of equality rights jurisprudence; the 
decision is consistent with a national normalization of human rights concepts. 
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Lovelace5 is an equality rights case, but one where the legislation underlying the 
alleged discrimination was not placed in issue. As a result, the logic in the case 
does not extend equality rights principles, although it does raise questions about 
the strategies to be used in future cases where laws of both levels of government 
are the basis of the alleged discrimination. Finally, Little Sisters6 is not really an 
equality rights case at all; it is really about freedom of expression. The breaches 
in that case were established clearly, so the real issues in the case concerned 
identification of the source of those breaches, and determination of the 
appropriate remedy. However, the appellants sought to argue that Canada‟s 
obscenity laws discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, and the Court does 
consider those arguments, even after it concluded that those issues were not 
properly raised in the case. 
II. GRANOVSKY V. CANADA (MINISTER OF  
EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION)7 
In Granovsky, the appellant sought a disability pension under the Canada 
Pension Plan. The Plan is a contributory scheme designed to provide benefits to 
workers who contribute to it. It includes provisions for payment of disability 
pensions to persons who are totally and permanently disabled and are thus forced 
to leave the work force. Since the Plan is designed to protect employment 
income, it requires that recipients have a “sufficient connection to the work force” 
as demonstrated by a record of contributions to the Plan. In particular, to be 
eligible for the disability pension, a claimant must have contributed to the Plan 
in two of the previous three years, or in five of the previous 10 years.  
Granovsky had a long history of back problems. He had been able to work 
from time to time, but had been unable to maintain long-term full-time 
employment. Granovsky had contributed to the Plan only once in the previous 
10 years, although he had contributed in roughly half of the 15 years prior to 
that. 
Granovsky alleged that the Plan discriminated against partially disabled 
persons, by making it more difficult for them to qualify for benefits on account 
of their inability to work as a result of disability. 
In the proceedings below, decision-makers had been unsympathetic to 
Granovsky‟s claim of disability, characterizing his chronic back ailment as a “back 
ache.” The Court noted that if it found for Granovsky, then the matter would have 
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to be sent back for a determination of whether he really was disabled as claimed. 
This factor should have no bearing on the constitutional argument, but it did seem 
to merit detailed comment by the Court. Although it is not stated in the decision, 
the Court may have been mindful that the threshold for an obligation to contribute 
to CPP is not high, and the Court may have had trouble in accepting the 
proposition that a person could be so disabled so as not to be able to contribute to 
CPP at all for nine out of 10 years, yet have been disabled only from time to time 
during that period. In reading the decision, one gets the sense that the Court may 
have felt, without finding, that the claimant must have been malingering in order 
to compile such a record. 
The Court found that Parliament did make allowances for persons temporarily 
out of the work force when it crafted the eligibility provisions for disability 
pensions by allowing non-contribution in one of the previous three or five of the 
previous 10 years. This is “line drawing,” and the Court found that Parliament 
had drawn the line in an appropriate place. Line drawing is inherently arbitrary. 
Here, workers are allowed some absences from the work force, but they must 
have a sufficient connection to the work force to engage the underlying purpose 
of the program: protection of employment income. 
There is one comment in the decision that deserves greater focus than was 
given by the Court. The complainant argued that if the Court ruled against him, 
he would be “thrown on” the welfare roles. The disability pension provision of 
the Plan is not a social benefit program standing in isolation from other income 
support programs. If, as a result of not being eligible for the disability pension, 
the complainant was “thrown on” the welfare roles, he would be in receipt of 
social assistance. There was no analysis of the relative levels of financial support 
the alternative programs would provide. A person who has been disabled his or 
her entire working life, and thus has had no opportunity to contribute to the CPP 
at all, would be treated no differently than the complainant, but presumably 
would be in receipt of other social assistance.  
The Court‟s logic does not resonate as strongly as it might, given the absence 
of a contextual analysis of other income support programs. In broad terms, 
Parliament has created a class of persons whom we may call “disabled 
workers.” The complainant did not qualify as such because he was not a 
“worker.” The complainant says that he was not a worker because of his long-
term partial disability — he was disabled for too long to qualify as a worker.  
Justice Binnie seemed to deny this contextual approach in his characterization 
of the Plan: “The CPP was designed to provide social insurance for Canadians 
who experience a loss of earnings owing to retirement, disability, or the death of a 
wage-earning spouse or parent. It is not a social welfare scheme.”8 It is not clear 
________________________________________________________________ 
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why a “social insurance” plan is not a “social welfare scheme,” unless a “social 
welfare scheme” is, by definition, a program of universal application solely based 
on a needs test. If so, the distinction is driven purely by definitions rather than 
functional distinctions, and is a tautology.  
Without placing the CPP in the context of the overall scheme of income 
support, it is well-nigh impossible to assess the effect of exclusion from that 
particular program. Thus, the analysis devolves to a review of “line drawing” 
by Parliament, and the usual sorts of questions that arise under such an 
analysis: 
 
The less severely disabled will no doubt argue that their interests are no less worthy of 
protection than those whose disabilities are more severe. Is the legislature then 
precluded from targeting the permanently disabled for special programs or services 
(special paratransit public bus facilities for example) without making the same 
services and programs available to those whose disabilities are temporary, and if so, 
how temporary would be sufficient to qualify?9 
 
This reasoning does not do justice to Granovsky‟s claim. He was not seeking 
to extend a program that is targeted to the permanently disabled. His claim is 
based on a permanent disability and is premised on the argument that he should 
not be denied benefits because he was temporarily disabled for many years prior 
to his permanent disability.  
The Court applied the Law test10 in finding that Parliament‟s line drawing is 
not discriminatory. Law calls for a “comparative approach,” where “[t]he 
identification of the group in relation to which the appellant can properly claim 
„unequal treatment‟ is crucial.”11 The appellant claimed that his situation should 
be compared to persons who were able-bodied during the years leading up to 
their disability. During those years, able-bodied persons are able to work and 
contribute to the CPP. Thus, when they become disabled, they qualify for a 
pension. Granovsky, solely by reason of disability, was unable to work 
sufficiently to make contributions. The effect, therefore, is to deny him a 
pension as a result of the long-term partial disability. 
The Court found that the appellant chose the wrong “comparator group.” 
Instead, the Court found that Granovsky should be compared to persons who 
were permanently disabled during the time he was partially disabled. If this 
comparison is correct, then the appellant received differential treatment because 
he did not receive a disability pension at the time that the members of the 
comparator group did receive one. This comparison, though, seems to 
________________________________________________________________ 
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mischaracterize the appellant‟s claim. He did not claim (as he might have) that 
restricting pensions to permanently disabled persons was constitutionally 
unsound. It was only when he became totally disabled that he claimed to be 
eligible for the pension. Thus, on the appellant‟s analysis, only persons who 
become permanently disabled are eligible for disability pensions. During the 
time preceding his total disability, he was not “like” those then in receipt of 
disability pensions, and did not seek to classify himself as such. He was treated 
like those who were not permanently disabled, and he did not challenge this 
classification in so far as he was not then in receipt of a pension.  
The Court‟s finding that Granovsky should be compared with permanently 
disabled persons does not affect the decision under the first branch of the Law 
test, and the Court concluded that Granovsky did suffer differential treatment. 
However, the choice of comparator group impacts on the later analysis:  
 
The appellant‟s argument depends upon the correctness of his choice of able-
bodied workers as the comparator group. He says “The appellant Granovsky wishes 
to make it clear that his submission is that he is relying on a comparison between 
temporary disabled persons and able-bodied persons. The fact that some adjustment 
has been made for „permanently disabled‟ persons is not the gravamen of Mr. 
Granovsky‟s complaint.” If, as I believe, he has picked the wrong comparator group, 
the rest of his analysis collapses under the weight of an erroneous premise.12 
 
If the proper comparator group is permanently disabled persons, then it was 
open to the Court to find that the program had been targeted to a group that is 
more disadvantaged than Granovsky. As is noted above, it must be the case that 
Parliament can target benefits to the permanently disabled in priority to the 
temporarily disabled. The problem with the comparison is that the appellant is 
permanently disabled now and seeks a benefit that is available to other persons 
who are permanently disabled. The reason he is denied that benefit is that in the 
past, he was partially disabled, and those receiving benefits were not (or at least 
were not to the same extent as the appellant). 
The Court‟s conclusion includes a recapitulation of the human dignity 
principles of which we will hear much more over the coming years:  
 
In these circumstances, in my opinion, the appellant fails to show that viewed from 
the perspective of the hypothetical “reasonable” individual who shares the 
appellant‟s attributes and who is dispassionate and fully apprised of the relevant 
circumstances … his dignity or legitimate aspirations to human self-fulfilment have 
been engaged.  
________________________________________________________________ 
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 In other words, the appellant has not demonstrated a convincing human rights 
dimension to his complaint….13 
 
As is noted in many cases (and in particular in Boisbriand, discussed below), 
disabilities have both subjective and objective dimensions. If we place the most 
positive gloss on the facts of Granovsky‟s case, here is a person with significant 
impairment of his ability to work as a result of disability. It has plagued him for 
many years. He struggles with it as best as he can, and continues to work, as 
best as and as much as he can over the years. He doesn‟t make much money 
during those long and painful years, but he does have work from time to time, 
and enjoys the participation in the work force and the dignity that comes with 
being a contributing member of society. Another person might have given up 
and claimed total and permanent disability at a much earlier stage. This sounds 
romantic and idealized, but there are many such people who work long past the 
time that others have given up and left the work force. Now, Granovsky reaches 
the stage where he simply must give up — his pain and functional limitations 
have progressed to the point where he simply cannot do it any more. He looks 
at those who gave up earlier, and they enjoy a pension because of their 
disability. He gets nothing. Why? Because he tried to work when he was 
seriously disabled. It is hard for us to understand how the denial of a pension to 
Granovsky under these circumstances would not engage his sense of self-worth 
and human dignity.  
The “human dignity” principle is, at least in this context, a rhetorical way of 
saying that a complaint is not a serious or profound one. We doubt that the 
“dispassionate” person in Granovsky‟s position would tell a personal tale of 
indifference. His story would sound more like our rendition of Granovsky‟s 
history than the Court‟s analysis of comparator groups and “drop-out” provisions.  
As an aside, the “immutability” principle seems to have re-emerged in the 
Court‟s section 15 analysis in this case: “Some of the grounds listed in s. 15 are 
clearly immutable, such as ethnic origin. A disability may be, but is not 
necessarily, immutable, in the sense of not being subject to change.”14 It had been 
thought by many that immutability had been rejected as a characteristic of protected 
grounds under section 15 in Egan,15 where the Court (unanimous on the point) 
found that the protected grounds are inherent characteristics that cannot be changed 
except at unacceptable personal cost.16 Immutability is a troubled concept and may 
serve to confuse section 15 analysis if it is reintroduced. As Justice Binnie 
acknowledged, disabilities may not be immutable, and often are not static. 
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Modern medicine is able to perform sex change operations, so even sex may be 
considered mutable. Age is an ever-changing characteristic, but one over which 
the individual can exercise no control. Political, philosophical and religious 
beliefs are clearly subject to change, but not simply as a product of will. Sexual 
orientation is a manifestation of desire, often coupled with chosen behaviour. 
One‟s innermost sexual desires are not matters of choice, but inevitably, 
decisions to have sex are so. The “immutability” concept could serve to cloud 
the application of the law to protected groups and, in our view, should not re-
enter Canadian equality rights discourse. 
III. QUEBEC (COMMISSION DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DES 
DROITS DE LA JEUNESSE) V. MONTRÉAL (CITY)17  
The unanimous decision of the Court was written by Madam Justice 
L‟Heureux-Dubé, and concerns three cases of persons who were rejected for 
employment or dismissed based on “physical anomalies” that do not result in 
functional limitations for the purposes of the employment for which they had 
applied or were engaged in prior to dismissal. The prospective employers took 
the position that the anomalies in question were not “handicaps,” and therefore 
were not protected under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.18  
The prospective employees were as follows: 
 
(1) Mercier was trained for and applied for a job as a gardener-horticulturalist 
with the City of Montreal. In a pre-employment medical examination, she 
was found to have a “minor thoracolumbar scoliosis.” The medical 
experts determined that Mercier was not at greater risk for lower back 
pain in the short, medium and long term.  
 
(2) Troloi was hired as a probationary employee for 12 months by the 
Boisbriand police force. He performed his duties admirably until he 
suffered an acute attack of ileitis. He was subsequently diagnosed with 
“Crohn‟s disease,” a chronic disease of the digestive tract that may 
remain benign, or may require several operations for treatment. Although 
Troloi enjoyed a complete recovery and was fully able to perform his 
duties as a police officer, Boisbriand dismissed him anyway, saying that it 
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(3) Hamon was refused employment with the Montreal police on the basis of 
anomalies in his spinal column that are asymptomatic and do not result in 
any discomfort, disability or limitation. The police department took the 
position that persons such as Hamon can be excluded because there is a risk 
that they will develop incapacitating and recurring lower back pain. 
 
The Court found that “handicap” is not restricted to handicaps that cause 
functional limitations, but includes ailments that do not give rise to any 
limitation or functional disability.19 As a result, all three of the prospective 
employees had been discriminated against on the basis of handicap since they all 
had ailments that did not create functional limitations on their abilities to work, 
but nonetheless were perceived as being obstacles to their employment.  
Although the decision runs for 87 paragraphs, it is straightforward. The 
proscription against discrimination on the basis of handicap in the context of 
employment, as set out in the Quebec Charter, is similar to human rights 
legislation found in other Canadian jurisdictions, and has at its core the goal of 
assisting handicapped persons “to take part in the life of the community on an 
equal level with others.”20  
 
It would be strange indeed if the legislature had intended to enable persons with 
handicaps that result in functional limitations to integrate into the job market, while 
excluding persons whose handicaps do not lead to functional limitations.21 
 
Indeed, “subjective and erroneous perceptions regarding the existence of such 
limitations” is the very essence of discrimination on the basis of handicap. It is the 
perception that an individual cannot perform work ably that is at the core of what is 
legally protected, and permitting even more arbitrary discrimination where there is 
no physical basis for the conclusion at all would be perverse.  
There is a second and complementary rationale for the decision. A 
“handicap” may not result in functional limitations today, but may do so 
tomorrow. Indeed, that fear lay at the heart of the decisions by the prospective 
employers to refuse to employ the complainants. “[T]he Charter also prohibits 
discrimination based on the actual or perceived possibility that an individual 
may develop a handicap in the future.”22  
This reasoning is consistent with the jurisprudence concerning the nature of 
discrimination on the basis of handicap/disability. It may also foreshadow future 
________________________________________________________________ 
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reasoning concerning the use of predictive tools to identify persons at higher risk 
for future medical problems, and then using that identification as a basis for 
imposing disadvantages on them (such as refusing them employment).  
From a business perspective, it makes sense that an employer would wish to 
hire employees that it hopes will have low rates of absenteeism and little risk of 
paid leave by reason of disability. Strict application of this business logic could 
potentially lead to the use of DNA testing of potential employees to obtain 
long-term predictions about their health history in order to predict the long-term 
risks that they will cause the employer in terms of greater expense by reason of 
ailment over the course of their working life.  
On the other hand, as is recognized in the Quebec Charter and similar 
legislation in other jurisdictions, an employer is entitled to satisfy itself that 
prospective employees are able to function in their jobs (i.e., to be satisfied that 
any functional limitations are not inconsistent with their ability to do their 
work). For example, an airline might fairly preclude persons with insufficient 
visual acuity from flying airplanes. This policy would not extend to an airline 
excluding a person with some abnormality of the eye that does not affect her 
ability to see at an acceptable level. The grey area arises where the prospective 
employee can see well enough now, but has a predisposition to premature loss 
of visual acuity that poses a greater than average risk of expense to the 
employer at a later stage. That question, however, is left to be determined 
within the second part of the human rights analysis: once there is a finding of 
discrimination based on handicap, the prospective employer may seek to justify 
that discrimination. That issue was not before the Court in these cases. 
Of note for future cases is the Court‟s reliance on section 15 of the Charter in 
reaching a conclusion that tends to harmonize human rights concepts among 
Canadian jurisdictions. It seems clear that nothing will turn on the use of 
differential terms such as “handicap” and “disability” in different human rights 
legislation and in the Charter. Although the Court has not stated that human 
rights legislation must “mirror” the protection afforded by section 15 of the 
Charter, when Boisbriand and Vriend23 are read together, it does seem that the 
Court is finding a nucleus of human rights protection that is national in scope. 
These decisions do not go so far as mandating such a national structure of human 
rights protection, but the discussion concerning remedy in Vriend suggests that 
the Court is inferring a common will across the country to develop and maintain 
consistent human rights standards.24 Although these standards may not be 
________________________________________________________________ 
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required by section 15 of the Charter, consistent reinforcing of these standards by 
the courts does contribute to a national rights culture that is bound to influence 
the political climate in which rights legislation is devised.  
Boisbriand is not as controversial as Vriend because the subject matter is less 
charged with religious and moral overtones. Within Quebec there may be 
resistance to what we see as a policy by the Court to find national standards — 
the national nature of which may be offensive to Quebec nationalists, who wish 
to promulgate their own made-in-Quebec standards. Seen in this light, we view 
Boisbriand as significant, more for what it says about the Court‟s role as a 
national institution than for the development of equality rights jurisprudence. 
IV. LOVELACE V. ONTARIO25  
1. Summary of the Decision 
Ontario established a program for the distribution of proceeds from a new 
casino to Ontario First Nations communities registered under the Indian Act 
(Canada).26 Various aboriginal communities not registered as bands under the 
Act sought to be included in the program. Ontario refused to include them, and, 
consequently, the appellants brought these proceedings. The Court held that 
Ontario‟s exclusion of non-registered communities did not constitute 
discrimination within the meaning of section 15(1). This finding did not 
necessitate a determination of whether the program was an “affirmative action 
program” protected under section 15(2). However, the court inclined to the 
view that section 15(2) is “confirmatory and supplementary to” section 15(1), 
rather than an exception to section 15(1).27 Since the program was found not to 
infringe section 15, there was no need to consider section 1 of the Charter.  
The Court also found that the program was intra vires Ontario: section 
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 186728 does not preclude provincial programs 
aimed at aboriginal peoples or communities. Ontario did not define which 
groups of aboriginal peoples are “First Nations” for the purposes of the casino 
project. Rather, Ontario used the definition of “band” found in the Indian Act, 
                                                                                                                                
concluded that Alberta would prefer to have human rights legislation. Justice Major, writing for 
himself, would not have read the protection into the Act, and instead would have left it to the 
legislature to respond. Neither approach precluded a broad range of responses from the legislature 
(including re-enacting the discriminatory legislation by use of the override provision).  
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and in so doing “has done nothing to impair the status or capacity of the 
appellants as aboriginal peoples.”29 
The heart of the appellants‟ argument was the plight of non-registered 
aboriginal communities. A compelling argument can be made that the 
classification systems promulgated by the Indian Act are discriminatory, but 
that argument was not before the court, and the Court declined to deal with a 
collateral attack on the federal law: “these important collateral issues are not 
properly raised in this appeal and, therefore, cannot be decided herein.”30 
The program, by directing substantial sums to bands registered under the 
Indian Act, has the effect of supporting and strengthening the institutions that 
arise as a consequence of federal policy. This institutional structure has, itself, 
led to distinctions between band communities and non-band communities in 
respect to land, government and gaming/casino issues. Although the categories of 
registered bands and non-registered communities are not hermetically distinct 
(each community having a distinctive history and situation), as a rule, registered 
bands are reserve-based, have a political infrastructure regulated by the Indian 
Act and have a history of government-to-government relations with the provinces 
and Canada. Ontario‟s program is designed to address the needs of registered 
bands, particularly in respect to the issues of land, self-government and 
ameliorating impoverished conditions through the distribution of resources to 
the bands.31 
The program, therefore, is said to be tailored to the circumstances of band 
communities, and those circumstances are, at least in part, a by-product of 
federal law and policy, which was not in issue in the case.  
The Court‟s reasoning is tautological once consideration of the 
discriminatory impact of federal law and policy is eliminated from the analysis. 
Canada has established institutional structures under the Indian Act which have 
influenced the structure of First Nations governance. Those communities 
included under the Indian Act have received certain benefits as a result of their 
inclusion, and have unique status under Canadian law. So-called “non-status” 
First Nations individuals and communities can argue (as they did in Lovelace) 
that they are the most disadvantaged of the disadvantaged, and that they suffer 
because of their wrongful exclusion of benefits under an unfair legal regime. It is 
a compelling argument, and for the sake of this comment, we presume it to be 
true. 
Ontario did not create the distinctions between First Nations persons and 
communities under the Indian Act. First Nations communities tend to be 
________________________________________________________________ 
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centred on identifiable reserve lands that have both political and proprietary 
significance. Self-governance is based, at least in part, on land and race, just as 
national and provincial claims to jurisdiction are based on territorial autonomy 
and definitions of the people who are included in or excluded from 
membership. Those who are excluded face the double burdens of being affected 
by the negative impacts of the institutional structures created by or supported 
by the Indian Act while simultaneously being excluded from benefits conferred 
by the Act on status bands and the members thereof.  
Further, issues have arisen as to the rights of First Nations to pursue gaming 
activities. Among other things, First Nations communities have taken the 
position that provincial regulation of gaming activities within the province do 
not apply to band reserves. If First Nations are permitted to conduct unlimited 
and unregulated gaming operations on reserves, then the province could face 
serious social problems extending far beyond the borders of the reserves.  
On this basis, the Court finds that Ontario‟s program is tailored to respond to 
the particular interests of bands under the Indian Act. Such discrimination as 
there may be arises by operation of policy decisions made by Canada rather 
than Ontario. For the purposes of Lovelace, the Indian Act is presumed to be 
constitutional, but it is from the Indian Act that the real problems arise. 
This decision may presage difficulties for equality rights litigation in the 
future, given the many overlapping areas of jurisdiction between federal and 
provincial levels of government. In Egan,32 the Court found that Canada could 
not rely upon provincial legislation to cure discrimination in a federal law. 
Now, in Lovelace, the Court has held that Ontario does not discriminate if it 
bases its categories of exclusion and inclusion on federal legislation that may 
itself be discriminatory. At first glance, this approach may be the most sensible 
way in which to structure constitutional discourse in a federal state: any attack 
on a law must be made directly, and not on a collateral basis. If the 
discrimination arises by reason of the Indian Act, then that Act must be put in 
issue, and Canada should be called upon to defend it. However, it is possible 
that (hypothetically) there could be discrimination in the Indian Act that could 
be saved under section 1, whereas the discriminatory impact of extending the 
application of the Indian Act to a provincial program could not be so saved. In a 
federal state, there must be some integration of legal concepts if policy and 
programs are to be harmonized and work together. It seems, for the moment at 
any rate, that where a section 15 challenge is made in an area of joint 
jurisdiction and action, the wisest course to take would be to challenge the 
legislative structure at both levels of government to avoid having a discriminatory 
________________________________________________________________ 
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basis for one jurisdiction‟s laws used as a basis to justify another jurisdiction‟s 
laws. 
V. LITTLE SISTERS BOOK AND ART EMPORIUM V. CANADA 
(MINISTER OF JUSTICE)33  
1. Summary of the Decision 
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium (“Little Sisters”) is a bookstore in 
Vancouver catering to the lesbian and gay communities. It is not a “XXX 
Bookstore” carrying predominately pornographic materials, but it does carry a 
range of materials about sex and sexuality including erotica aimed at lesbians 
and gay men. Little Sisters alleged that it had been discriminated against by 
Canada Customs officials going back to 1984, by outright prohibitions on the 
importation of legal materials and extensive delays and costs associated with 
confiscations and reviews of legal materials that Little Sisters sought to import 
for sale in its store. 
The Customs Act and the schedules under the Customs Tariff legislation 
authorize Customs officials to intercept materials imported into Canada, and to 
reject their importation if those materials are found to be obscene within the 
meaning of that term under section 163 of the Criminal Code.34 Little Sisters 
claimed that this legislation contravened its rights to free speech, and 
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. Little Sisters also claimed that 
the conduct of Customs officials pursuant to the impugned legislation 
contravened these same rights. 
Little Sisters placed a rich factual record before the trial court, establishing 
systematic differential treatment by Customs officials over a period of several 
years. The evidence established that : 
 
(1) materials imported by Little Sisters were detained for lengthy periods, and in 
some cases ruled obscene by Customs officials when those same materials 
were freely imported by “mainstream” bookstores, and in some cases were 
available in local public libraries;  
(2) Customs officials had little training and inadequate resources to make 
determinations of “obscenity,” and frequently did so on the basis of 
superficial reviews of the materials before them; 
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(3) standards applied by Customs officials included a proscription against 
depictions of anal intercourse despite court rulings and opinions from 
the Department of Justice that depictions of anal intercourse are not 
obscene in and of themselves; 
(4) the administrative structure put in place for the exercise of Customs‟ 
jurisdiction to prevent importation of “obscene” materials was 
cumbersome, slow, impenetrable, and involved a reverse onus clause 
imposed on the importer once an initial determination of obscenity had 
been made by Customs officials; and 
(5) the treatment suffered by Little Sisters over the years was specifically 
targeted against it, and there was no basis for this targeting other than an 
apprehension by Customs officials that erotica aimed at lesbians and 
gay men was more suspect than other forms of erotica. Little Sisters had 
been subjected to more intense scrutiny than adult bookstores catering 
to a heterosexual clientele. 
 
The majority of the Court found that the impugned legislative scheme is a 
prima facie violation of the right to free speech, and thus must be justified by 
the state under section 1 of the Charter. The same justifications for laws 
prohibiting obscenity, which were upheld in Butler,35 were available to justify 
prohibitions on the importation of obscene materials into Canada. However, the 
actions of Customs officials pursuant to the legislation were not justifiable: the 
officials must apply the community standards harm test in accordance with 
Butler to determine whether materials are obscene. On the facts of this case, 
Customs officials had applied the standard erroneously, and in the process had 
infringed Little Sisters‟ freedom of speech and right to be free from 
discrimination. The impugned legislation did contain a reverse onus provision 
that was constitutionally impermissible, but aside from that provision, the 
legislation itself was found to be constitutional. The appropriate remedy in this 
case must respond to the unconstitutional conduct by officials.  
Given the time that had elapsed since the trial commenced, and the changes 
Canada has made since that time in the way in which it administers the 
legislation, it was not appropriate for the Court to do more than uphold the 
declaration by the trial judge that rights and freedoms had been infringed in the 
past. Any future problems in the application of the legislation as regards Little 
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(a) Discriminatory Standards of Obscenity 
There are serious problems with the Butler decision, and those problems 
colour the decision in Little Sisters. Little Sisters argued that the principles in 
Butler focus on community standards and harm done as a consequence of the 
publication and consumption of certain kinds of graphic materials. The Court 
was unwilling to entertain a collateral attack on the constitutionality of the 
obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code: “No constitutional question was 
stated regarding the validity or constitutional limits of s. 163 of the Criminal 
Code. The absence of notice of such a constitutional question precludes the 
wide-ranging reconsideration of Butler sought by the appellants and some of 
the intervenors …”36 Thus, the decision in Little Sisters proceeds on the 
presumption that Butler is good law. Within that framework, the appellants 
asked the Court to find that there should be differential application of Butler to 
gay and lesbian erotica.  
Butler is premised on a “harms”-based analysis. The “harms” in question 
conflate sex, violence and objectification of the body, usually to the detriment of 
women.37 Assuming (without agreeing) that there is such harm in some 
heterosexual pornography, the same cannot usually be said to hold true for same-
sex erotica, which does not reinforce delimited sexual stereotypes and power 
imbalances. On a philosophical level, it could be argued that same-sex 
pornography actually undermines typical gender stereotypes, rather than 
reinforcing them. As a matter of common sense, depictions of sexual activity 
between members of the same sex do not implicate power imbalances between 
genders. That does not mean, however, that same-sex erotica/pornography is free 
from power imbalances or degradation.  
It is also arguable that pornography has an educative function in the lesbian 
and gay communities in a way that heterosexual pornography does not. Popular 
culture includes pervasive images of sexualized behaviour between 
heterosexuals — from the clinical forms of sex education available in schools 
to depictions of sex on television, in the movies and in literature. Until quite 
recently, there have been few comparable sources of information for lesbians 
and gay men about how to be sexual with each other, and pornography has 
served the function of illustrating a range of same-sex sexual practices. It is at 
least arguable, then, that pornography in the lesbian and gay communities is an 
important source of information for lesbians and gay men. It may perform an 
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even more important task by normalizing the conduct it depicts. Photographs 
and videos are artefacts, and the fact that they exist and are permitted to exist 
bestows upon them a legitimacy and reality that may normalize same-sex 
sexuality itself, an important side effect for lesbians and gay men struggling 
with the minority status of their sexual desires. However, the argument can be 
turned on its head: the more significant the images, the greater the need to draw 
some boundaries between acceptable depictions and those that promote 
degradation. Put another way, if lesbians and gay men are learning how to be 
sexual from pornography, it is perhaps all the more important that they are not 
learning that degradation is part of healthy sexual conduct.  
Theoretical discussions about sex and the body are interesting, and we agree 
that there are important cultural differences between heterosexual and same-sex 
sexual norms. However, of what practical use is the discussion for the Supreme 
Court of Canada? The Court was asked to find that different standards should 
apply to same-sex pornography. Justice Binnie held that taking this argument to 
its logical conclusion “would mean that gay and lesbian publications would not 
be subject to the ordinary border regime applicable to other forms of 
expression.”38 In addition, these publications would not be subject to the same 
criminal prohibitions found in the Criminal Code.  
In essence, these arguments cannot form the basis for a section 15 claim 
without addressing the general law of obscenity and the test in Butler. The test 
applied under Butler is whether the depictions are “degrading or dehumanizing” 
and fails the community standards tolerance of harm test.39 This is a minefield for 
lesbian and gay erotica. As was argued to the Court by the appellants, the record 
of the Customs officials is evidence, in and of itself, that principles of general 
application as to what constitutes “degrading or dehumanizing” depictions, and 
what the community perceives to be harmful to society, is ineluctably shaped by a 
heterosexual view of the world. On no view of the test would consensual vaginal 
intercourse between consenting partners, by itself, violate the Butler standard. On 
the view of Customs personnel for over a decade, consensual anal intercourse 
between consenting same-sex partners was obscene.  
It is simply unacceptable, however, that a group of persons should be 
exempted from the application of a provision of the Criminal Code. We say this 
not as a statement of legal principle, but of political reality. The lesbian and gay 
community cannot take itself out of the criminal laws of general application 
simply on the basis that its communities are different, and that majoritarian 
standards of sexual propriety are discriminatory. However, the majoritarian 
standards of sexual propriety are inherently discriminatory: what a heterosexual 
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man would find degrading, if done to him, may well be the height of desire for 
a gay man. As has been stated repeatedly by the Supreme Court,40 gay people 
have suffered a long history of disadvantage. Although discrimination in the 
law has been reduced by legislation and court decisions over the past two 
decades, and the pace of that reduction has accelerated in recent years as a 
consequence of authoritative decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada, it 
would be naïve to suggest that social discrimination has been eliminated. It is 
here that the community standards harms-based test becomes problematic, and 
where Justice Binnie‟s reasons fail to address the underlying difficulties with 
state supervision of lesbian and gay erotica under the rubric of Butler. The 
problem is best captured in the following passage: 
 
The test is therefore not only concerned with harm, but harm that rises to the level 
of being incompatible with the proper functioning of Canadian society. The 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) argues that “for gays and lesbians 
erotica and other material with sexual content is not harmful and is in fact a key 
element of the quest for self-fulfilment” (factum, at para. 14). So described, the 
CCLA has defined the material safely outside the Butler paradigm. Butler placed 
harmful expression — not sexual expression — at the margin of s. 2(b).41 
 
It should be obvious why such a result is troubling for lesbians and gay men. 
The general standard is a heterosexual one. It is by definition majoritarian.  
Justice Binnie found that “gay and lesbian culture as such does not constitute 
a general exemption from the Butler test.”42 Put another way, “the attempt to 
carve out of Butler a special exception for gay and lesbian erotica should be 
rejected.”43 How could the Court find otherwise? And yet, the Court‟s refusal to 
carve out a special exception leaves unanswered the justified critique of the 
Butler principles as they are applied to lesbian and gay erotica: how can 
“community standards” for sexually explicit material be applied fairly to lesbian 
and gay erotica when the standards are heterosexual and are applied by 
heterosexuals? The answer is more rhetorical riposte than analytical conclusion. 
If there is a variable standard to be applied, then whose standard is it to be? 
 
[Little Sisters] operate[s] a bookstore in a very public place open to anyone who 
happens by, including potentially outraged individuals of the local community who 
might wish to have the bookstore closed down altogether. If “special standards” are 
to apply, whose “special standard” is it to be? There is some safety in numbers, and 
________________________________________________________________ 
40
 In, for example, Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; Vriend v. Alberta, supra, note 
23; and M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
41
 Little Sisters, supra, note 33, at 1162. 
42
 Id., at 1164. 
43
 Id., at 1166-67. 




a national constituency that is made up of many different minorities is a guarantee 
of tolerance for minority expression.44 
 
This argument provides cold comfort for those negatively affected by the 
current obscenity standard, but it is an inevitable by-product of the reasoning in 
Butler. If the test for harm is based on the community‟s sense of what is 
harmful, and is not to collapse into hopelessly subjective considerations, then 
there must be a fictional “national constituency” where the trier of fact looks to 
find a measuring stick that is something other than the trier‟s own personal 
sense of what is not to be tolerated. Justice Binnie reviewed the recent 
applications of the Butler standard and concluded that “[w]e have no evidence 
that the courts are not able to apply the Butler test, and the reported decisions 
seem to confirm that the identification of harm is a well understood 
requirement …”45  
(b) Remedies 
Little Sisters traced the violation of its rights to the impugned Customs 
legislation. Justice Binnie found that one provision of the law is 
unconstitutional: the reverse onus obligation on an importer to show that 
materials are not obscene once the state has decided that they are. This finding 
does not alter the general administrative structure of the applicable customs 
law, which provides a general instruction to Customs officials to prohibit the 
importation of materials that are “obscene” within the meaning of the Criminal 
Code. It is left to the state to establish the means by which this general 
requirement is to be carried out.  
Little Sisters argued that “a regulatory structure that is open to the level of 
maladministration described in the trial judgment is unconstitutionally 
underprotective of [its] constitutional rights and should be struck down in its 
entirety.”46 On this point, the majority and the dissent part company. Justice 
Binnie found there is nothing wrong with the legislation itself, and that the fault 
lies in its implementation by the servants of the Crown: “A failure at the 
implementation level, which clearly existed here, can be addressed at the 
implementation level.”47  
 
… an importer‟s rights may be protected in fact by statute, regulation, ministerial 
direction or even departmental practice. What is crucial, at the end of the day, is 
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that Charter rights are in fact respected. The modalities for achieving that objective 
will vary with the context. There is nothing unconstitutional about the option 
selected by Parliament in this case.48  
 
This analysis is persuasive: many protections afforded under the criminal law, 
for example, are not spelled out in legislation, but instead are entrusted to law 
enforcement agencies to enforce. Charter requirements should inform the exercise 
of public power, whether that exercise derives directly from legislation itself, or 
as a result of action taken pursuant to the law. These general propositions do not 
seem controversial. 
What is missing from the analysis, though, is a practical assessment of the 
prospect of constitutional enforcement of obscenity laws by agents of Canada 
Customs. It is possible, of course, for Canada Customs to expend the resources 
necessary to train its personnel properly for the task, but it should be remembered 
that the primary focus of the work of Customs is not to enforce the Criminal 
Code. Customs is engaged in regulating trade across the border, levying and 
collecting taxes associated with imports, and prohibiting the import of items that 
are not permitted in the country. “Obscene” materials are only a small subset of 
items that may be imported illegally.  
The record was replete with references to the inadequacy of the job done by 
Customs in respect to potentially “obscene” materials. Printed matter was not 
read thoroughly, but rather was scanned to determine if various salacious 
references were found with minimum frequency. Such a review could not 
possibly provide a basis for assessing the artistic merit of the reviewed work. 
Customs officials had minimal training. The task of reviewing materials for 
obscenity is an unpopular one in the Customs bureau, and most staff members 
do not stay in that position for very long.  
The record did not disclose the proportion of reviewed materials that was 
destined for retail sale. The argument concerning institutional competence may 
well depend on such an analysis. If, as we suspect, the vast majority of 
intercepted materials are destined for retail businesses where they are offered 
for sale to the public, then it would seem to be folly to assign the task of review 
to Customs, rather than to local police, who are charged with enforcing the very 
same obscenity standards. If a retailer imports an obscene publication, it can be 
charged when the material is offered for sale to the public. 
Justice Binnie adverted to the question of institutional competence 
throughout his reasons without putting that question squarely in issue: “The 
problem here is not with the legislators but with the failure of those responsible 
to exercise the powers that they possess, including, according to the trial judge, 
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the failure of Customs to make available adequate resources to do the job 
effectively.”49 
Justice Iacobucci, writing in dissent, found that where legislation “lends itself 
to the repeated violations of Charter rights, as does the legislative scheme here, 
the legislation itself is partially responsible and must be remedied.”50 The proper 
test is not whether the legislation is facially neutral and could be applied in a 
constitutionally sound manner. “Instead, the crucial consideration is that the 
legislation makes no reasonable effort to ensure that it will be applied 
constitutionally to expressive materials. It lacks an adequate process to ensure 
that s. 2(b) rights are fully considered and respected.”51  
Justice Iacobucci‟s conclusion — as a matter of practical common sense — 
simply must be correct: “The need for structural reform is reinforced by Customs‟ 
long history of excessive, inappropriate censorship. … These are not the kinds of 
problems that can be solved by simply directing Customs to behave 
themselves.”52 Justice Iacobucci provided detailed suggestions as to the sorts of 
institutional reform that could lead to proper safeguards when reviewing imported 
materials for obscenity. At the core of Justice Iacobucci‟s reasoning is the 
underlying conclusion — driven by the factual record set out in the decision — that 
Customs, as currently organized, simply lacks the institutional competence and will 
to make determinations of obscenity in conformity with Charter guarantees. 
Although the decision in the case will not require legislative action by Parliament, 
Justice Iacobucci advocated that it do so nonetheless: “I hope that Parliament … 
will address the problems identified in this appeal even without an order from this 
Court.”53 
To this extent, both Binnie and Iacobucci JJ. are correct. Justice Binnie 
concluded that the law itself is facially neutral, and that Customs can enforce 
the law in compliance with the Charter. Justice Iacobucci found that the record 
and the evidence of institutional limitations are such that although it may be 
possible for Customs to comply with the Charter, it is unrealistic to expect that 
it will do so without firm and direct guidance from Parliament. Both being 
correct, in our respectful view, Justice Iacobucci‟s approach is the more 
pragmatic. It is to be hoped that Parliament heeds his call for reform, even 
though it is not compelled to do so by order of the Court. 
On the face of the decision, it seems odd that the Court chose to comment on 
the practical application of Butler after already holding that it could not embark 
upon a consideration of the constitutional status of that decision. However, the 
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comment is a proper response to the concerns raised by Little Sisters: an 
inappropriate application of Butler is a failure by Customs officials (as the 
Court concludes). An inherently discriminatory test for obscenity, arising from 
the logic and natural application of Butler, is a proper section 15 claim for 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Although the Court expressly 
declined to deal with the challenge to Butler, it effectively did so and found that 
Butler, properly interpreted and applied, would not lead to discriminatory 
results. It may be that the Court will be prepared to reconsider these points in a 
case where Butler is put squarely in issue, but the logic of the decision suggests 
that the Court is not favourably disposed to such a challenge. In our view, 
advocates for sexual minorities will have to return to the drawing board to 
devise an analysis that protects minority tastes within the structure of Butler, at 
least for the foreseeable future.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
While we do not find a unifying theme among these cases, the deference 
shown legislatures in these cases does support the view that the Court has 
moved away from the more “activist” days of the Dickson and even the Lamer 
Courts. The application of Law in Granovsky seems to lead towards a rather 
mechanical exercise in comparison that focuses more on the choices that the 
state faces in drawing its lines than upon the effect of those choices on 
disadvantaged persons. If Law continues to be applied in this fashion, we 
expect that equality rights cases will prove increasingly more difficult to win. 
Although the Court found for the claimants in Boisbriand, the question was one 
of interpretation of legislation, rather than its constitutionality. Effectively, the 
Court found that Quebec chose a standard consistent with the national standard. 
In Lovelace, the Court upheld Ontario‟s program without placing emphasis on 
the effect the program has upon the appellants. The federal legislation that 
creates the distinctions relied upon by Ontario became part of the context of the 
case, rather than an integral aspect of the constitutional challenge itself. Finally, 
in Little Sisters, the Court showed great deference to Parliament in its choice of 
remedy. 
We are critical of the “human dignity” test in Law. We see it as rhetorical 
rather than analytical, but we do agree that human dignity is the central interest 
protected by equality rights. A true assessment of the impact of a law on human 
dignity requires a close and careful consideration of the effect of the law on the 
claimant. Effective equality rights protection requires that there be effective 
remedies available once a violation of equality rights has been identified. One 
would expect that an analysis of these aspects of an equality rights claim would 
be at the forefront of any section 15 decision. We are uneasy that such was not 




the case in Lovelace and Little Sisters, and we believe that the focus in 
Granovsky was misplaced. However, the Court has not rejected an effects-
based equality rights analysis, and it remains to be seen how that analysis will 
be balanced against the need to accord the state sufficient latitude to develop 
and implement social policy. 
